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Abstract: The benefits of distributed generation (DG) based on renewable energy sources leads to
its high integration in the distribution network (DN). Despite its well-known benefits, mainly in
improving the distribution system reliability and security, there are challenges encountered from
a protection system perspective. Traditionally, the design and operation of the protection system
are based on a unidirectional power flow in the distribution network. However, the integration of
distributed generation causes multidirectional power flows in the system. Therefore, the existing
protection systems require some improvement or modification to address this new feature.
Various protection strategies for distribution system have been proposed so that the benefits of
distributed generation can be fully utilized. This paper reviews the current progress in protection
strategies to mitigate the impact of distributed generation in the distribution network. In general,
the reviewed strategies in this paper are divided into: (1) conventional protection systems and
(2) modifications of the protection systems. A comparative study is presented in terms of the
respective benefits, shortcomings and implementation cost. Future directions for research in this area
are also presented.
Keywords: distributed generation; distribution system protection; protection coordination
1. Introduction
In line with the concern about sustainability and environmental issues, distribution systems
nowadays are continuously being connected to distributed generation (DG) based on renewable
energy sources. Wind, solar, biomass and mini-hydro are common renewable energy sources used
as a DG source to generate electricity. Besides the benefits of being environmentally friendly, DG
integration also improves the reliability of electrical supply and contributes to overall lower power loss
since its location is close to loads. Despite these benefits, integration of a high number of DG sources
will cause new challenges in the protection systems of DNs. Thus, the impact of DG on the DN must
be considered carefully in ensuring proper protection design thus allowing it to work effectively [1,2].
In the past, DNs have always been operated based on the condition that there is no DG in
the network [3,4]. Most distribution network operators (DNOs) apply a radial feeder system to
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deliver power to customers. The implemented protection strategies are based on the consideration
of unidirectional current flow, or with the small amount of reverse fault current due to motor
contribution [5,6]. Injection of power from DG into DNs causes the network to have multidirectional
power flows. Subsequently, the existing protection systems become ineffective or even fail to detect faults
due to losses of coordination between protection devices such as relays, fuses and breakers [7,8]. The level
of protection failure depends on the number of DGs, location, size, and type. In some cases, a complete
loss of coordination is recorded, while in other cases the protection coordination simply weakens [9].
Another impact of DG integration is the change of fault current levels. Normally, radial
distribution lines only consider the largest fault current from one source which simplifies the fault
current analysis. However, when DGs present in the system, it makes the DN to be multi-sourced,
and thus there will be possibilities of having more than one fault current direction. This will increase
the fault current level and therefore protection coordination settings require some adjustment.
For DNs without DGs, the strategies to mitigate the protection coordination problem have been
proven to work well [10–12]. On the other hand, for DNs with DGs, the solutions to the protection
coordination problem are still being explored. This paper reviews the current progress in protection
strategies to mitigate the impact of DGs in distribution networks. This paper is structured according to
the following sections: Section 2 illustrates the impact of connecting DGs in a distribution system from
the protection perspective. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the mitigation strategies presented by various
authors to overcome DGs’ impacts on the distribution protection system which can be categorized
into two main strategies: conventional and modified systems, with discussions on their respective
advantages and disadvantages. Section 5 draws readers’ attention to the factors to be considered while
connecting the DGs and issues around them, mainly due to planning and operational considerations.
Finally, conclusions and recommendations from the review and potential future research work are
presented in Section 6.
2. Impact of DG on Distribution Protection System Coordination
High reliability of the power supply is the main concern of power system industries. The power
utilities need to ensure any new connected load or supply will not harm the network and protection
scheme. Therefore, in Malaysia, for example, any new photovoltaic (PV) installation requires approval
from Tenaga Nasional Berhad, as a DNO in Malaysia. A power system analysis will be done by the
utility before any permit is issued. The control in DG connection is to avoid instability and preserve
the security of the DN.
Protection systems are initially designed based on the passive paradigm and only protect in a
unidirectional sense. The connection of DGs has changed networks to be active and conventional
protection system turn out to be unsuitable for this type of network [13–15]. For example, the sensitivity
of line protection is reduced when a group of DGs cause reverse power flow. The trip may fail due to
the result of forward and reverse current flow which is smaller than the protection setting threshold
value. In other words, the reverse power flow can cause a blindness to the overcurrent protection.
Furthermore, under certain conditions, if the reverse current from a healthy feeder, which has DGs,
to the faulted point (e.g., an adjacent feeder) is too high, it will cause the unwanted tripping health
departures [16]. Therefore, the traditional protection schemes might not work successfully with the
presence of DGs in DNs.
The worst scenario occurs when the total DG power output is higher than the downstream load.
This will cause power flow to the upstream and to the grid site. Similarly, when faults occur in
the network, the fault current is only contributed by the sources upstream of the faulted location.
However, with the high penetration of DGs, miscoordination problems occur due to the unplanned
fault currents contribution from DGs to the faulted point [17–20]. As a result, the load feeder will
see an increased fault current, meanwhile the upstream feeder circuit sees a decreased fault current,
which may reduce the sensitivity of the protection system [21]. In addition, the fault contribution from
DGs also changes the short circuit levels in the system. In a passive network, the breaking capacity in
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the downstream feeder is normally lower than that of an upstream feeder [20,22]. However, with the
connection of DGs, the fault current might be higher than the breaking capacity of circuit breakers
and fuses, thus causing protection system malfunctions. Besides that, the instantaneous overcurrent
protection might lose its sensitivity and lead to inadequate tripping [23].
The protection miscoordination between two adjacent feeders can also occur when DGs are
installed in DNs. When a fault current occurs at the first feeder, only the protection device located in
that faulted feeder should operate. However, the protection device in an adjacent feeder (which has
a DG unit) may operate due to the fault current contribution from the DG to the faulted point.
This can cause electricity interruptions. Therefore, the coordination between recloser and fuse is
likely to be disrupted which causes unnecessary outages in the healthy part of the system [24].
Furthermore, the misoperation protection problems may change the temporary faults to permanent
faults, false tripping in feeder and generation unit, protection blinding, undesirable network islanding
and prevent asynchronous re-closing [2,14,25,26]. Several methods have been proposed to overcome
these problems and most of it will be very costly due to the replacement of protection components
such as fuses or protection devices.
3. Protection Strategies for Conventional Distribution System Connected with DG
In order to overcome the problem discussed in Section 2, various mitigation strategies for
protection of DNs connected with DGs were proposed by researchers. The strategies can be categorized
into two approaches. The first approach is based on conventional protection with minimum changes,
which will minimize the cost and operational disruption mainly to the industrial consumer. The other
approach involves modification of the conventional distribution system by introducing additional
components related to the protection system. Figure 1 summarizes various mitigation strategies for
the protection of DNs connected with DGs.
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Figure 1. Protection strategies to mitigate the impact of DGs on DNs.
In this section, a discussion of strategies to mitigate the impact of DG will focus on the aspect
of conventional protection schemes. The main motivation behind these protection strategies is to
minimize implementation costs. Therefore, t e trategies utilize existing onventio al p otection,
switching and sensing d vice components. This section also covers current practice in the industry and
recent progress proposed by researchers. Comparison for type of protection devices, requirements of
communication links, cost, advantages and disadvantages of each strategy are summarized in Table 1.
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3.1. Current Practices
In general, there are two protection strategies which are being practiced by DNO and DG owners.
The first strategy requires DGs to be disconnected from the network when a fault happens. In contrast,
the second strategy allows DGs to remain connected when a fault happen. These strategies are based
on particular standards developed by international bodies such as IEC and IEEE. It specifies the
protection requirement in the Utility Grid Code, prepared by the DNOs, which prioritize reliability of
supply to the consumer.
3.1.1. Disconnection of DG When Fault Happen
According to the IEEE 1547–2003 Standard: Interconnecting Distributed Resources with Electric
Power Systems, DGs are required to be disconnected immediately when a fault occurs in the DN [27].
Mandatory interconnection requirements of all DG types at the point of common coupling (PCC)
having capacity up to 10 MVA has been addressed in the standard. The reason of disconnection is to
avoid healthy zones from being affected due to fault [28]. This standard had been applied widely in
the Canada and United States [29].
In addition to the above requirement, another standard is IEEE 1574 which applies to PV Power
Plants (PVPP) under 10 MVA. The IEEE 1574 standard specifies that when an unintentional islanding
incident appears, and the DG continues to energize a portion of the power system (island) through
the PCC, the PV system should sense it. Within a period of two seconds it should stop the power
generation. This anti-islanding requirement is to protect the remaining network operation which is
also a condition in Underwriters Laboratories specification UL 1571, German Standard VDE 0126-1-1
and Australian Standard 4777.3 [30–32].
Most of existing practices, especially in North America, require disconnection of DGs when
faults happen to avoid islanding [33]. This practice differs significantly for European DNOs which
allow islanding operations [34]. In contrast with the intentional islanding which is permitted,
the unintentional islanding mode is prohibited in various countries due to reliability and safety
factors. In IEEE 1547, a maximum delay of two seconds is given for a DG to sense and detach from
an unintentional island as had been practiced in U.S., U.K., and Australian standards. The German
standard allows a longer maximum time delay of five seconds [29].
Both approaches either remain connected or disconnected during fault, and have their advantages.
For a conventional DN the best option is to disconnect the DG to avoid technical and safety issues.
Meanwhile, for a DN equipped with a proper islanding strategy, the best option is to allow the DG to
continue energized. This will maximize the DG usage, where it can supply if not all loads some portion
of the DN that is healthy. If this can be done, the reliability of the energy supply can be improved.
To overcome this issue, the DG must remain connected in order to sustain voltage recovery by having
fault-ride-through (FRT) capability [35].
3.1.2. DG Remains Connected When Faults Happen
In this case, DGs are enabled with FRT capability to avoid disconnection from the islanded
network resulting from the occurrence of faults in the network. FRT is predominantly intended
to protect consumers’ power supplies and to support the grid during contingencies. FRT is also
capable of protecting the DN from being damaged by additional fault currents from DGs. From the
DNO’s viewpoint, FRTs can ensure safety for personnel from being exposed to accident or injury
during switching operation [36].
Generally, FRT can be achieved by delaying the time to trip the protection device and its sole
purpose is to avoid unnecessary disconnection of DGs by riding through short-term disturbances.
DN stability can be achieved via FRT capability, particularly in areas with high DG penetration [37].
In [38–40], FRT capability had been discussed, focusing on interconnection protection requirement.
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Table 1. Comparison of protection strategies for conventional DN connected with DG.





1. Disconnect DG from
network when
fault happen
 Prevent the fault from affecting the healthy zone.
 Prevent islanding.
 Important for protection of the DG itself.
 Changes to the existing relay coordination setting is
not required.
 Limiting the DG capacity i.e., underutilize.
 Demote the DG capability as a back-up and
alternative source.
 DG disconnection each time a fault happen may
disturb the DN which affected the system reliability.
Over Current
Relay No Reasonable
2. DG must ride through
fault and
remain connected
 Fault-ride-through (FRT) capability.
 Help to support voltage recovery.
 Provide grid support and increase security and
reliability of electricity supply.
 Protect DN from damage due to fault current
from DG.
 Protect DNO personnel from accident and injury.
 Higher cost to meet the FRT requirement.
 Risk of unintentional islanding effects i.e. safety and
DN reliability.
 FRT capability is depending on the robustness of
national power systems.
 Difficulties in fault detection and isolation due to
fault current contributions of less than the DG rated
current. Control techniques (e.g., inverter) which






 Do not affect the protection system by feeding
power sufficiently for the consumption load.
 For a new DG planned to be connected, the best
capacity and location can be determined according
to optimization method and its constraints. Thus,
efficient usage and cost can be achieved by sizing
only the allowable output capacity.
 Minimize incidents of loss of
protection coordination.
 For an existing DG, it will limit DG penetration
based on its full capacity.
 Practically, options to determine the DG size and
placement may not be available due to geographical
constraint, land acquisition and land area, etc.
 DG capacity is being limited to its load
consumption and will miss the opportunity to sell
electric power to DNO when DG has extra power
generated or low load consumption.
Over Current
Relay No Reasonable
4. Limits DG output
current according to
DG terminal voltage
 Easy to implement.
 Does not limit DG size in the existing DN.
 Does not involve any modification in the
existing DN.
 Stable against non-fault transient disturbances
produced by induction motors starting current, load
switching, etc.
 Application limited to inverter-based DG. Fuse-recloser
coordination No Reasonable
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Due to the advantages of FRT, various utility grid companies around the world specify their
requirements in their grid code to facilitate large DG penetration [41]. For DG of PV types, FRT
capability is found different in various countries, as presented in Table 2. It can be seen that most
countries allow only short duration of faults which is not more than 150 milliseconds [37]. The FRT
capability varies according to the level of DG penetration and stability of the grid.
Table 2. FRT capability requirements for PVDG according to different national grid codes [33,42,43].
Country Fault-Ride-Through Capability
Fault Duration (ms) Voltage Drop Level (Urated) Post Fault Time Recovery (s)
Canada (Hydro-Quebec) 150 0% 0.18
Denmark 50 20% 1
Egypt 250 0% 10
Germany 150 0% 3
Ireland 600 50% -
Malaysia 150 0% 5
Spain 500 20% 0.5
UK 140 15% 1.2
Figure 2 and Table 3 present an example of FRT for DN in Germany which indicates the FRT
requirement for PVDG and its behavior during a fault condition [32].
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Table 3. FRT requirement for PVDG and its behavior during fault conditions [32].
Zone Behavior During Fault Remarks
1 DG must remain connected The PVDG must not disconnect although fault happen at 0V within a duration of 150 ms.
2 DG may disconnect The PVDG is permitted to disengage from DN depending on contract.
3 DG must disconnect Protection relays to disengage the PVPP from DN.
3.2. Optimal DG Placement and Capacity
Researchers had proposed various strategies to find the optimum capacity and location of DGs,
so that the protecti n system will not be affected by the DG connection. Fo example, by using
the optimal p wer flow (OPF), the lim ting factors an be ide tified. This will assist the DNO to
make decisions on further investment, whether to permit more DG in the network or to limit it [44].
In [10], a particle swarm optimization algorithm (PSO) was used to maximize the DG penetration
level, with consideration on various aspects including protection coordination constraints, operating
time limits of overcurrent relay (OCR) and harmonics distortion levels. The proposed optimization
method can be used as a reference in planning works by DNOs. It can optimally allocate different
types of DG in DNs, and subsequently reach better penetration levels. The optimum capacity and
placement of DGs relied on the constraint; not to violate the operating time and protection coordination
of OCR units. This constraint limits the DG penetration level due to the difference in fault current from
synchronous-based DGs. The proposed method was tested on the IEEE-30 bus with ten loads and DG
scenarios. Nevertheless, in this paper, the authors did not considered variations in investment cost for DG
installation. Figure 3 explains the basic framework of fitness evaluation sequence using the PSO technique.
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In [45], the technical and economical challenge in redesigning and replacing the existing protection
system for a DN considering the growth of DG penetration is analyzed. To overcome it, a strategy
was proposed to optimize the DG placement and sizing without modifying the existing protection
system. The constraint for this simulation study is based on the existing relay protection system which
will set the allowable short circuit currents to protect the DN from false tripping and failure to trip.
The proposed method is tested for an IEEE 33 bus system and genetic algorithm (GA) is used to solve
this complex problem.
In [46,47], a strategy which focuses only on the optimum size of DG was presented. Mirsaeidi et al.
in [47] calculate the DG maximum size at each bus in order to prevent protection miscoordination in DNs.
DG capacity was increased and decreased according to the calculated short circuit and relay operating
times. Then the relays were graded to ensure the protection coordination requirements are satisfied.
The simulation was performed on a typical distribution feeder using the DIgSILENT software package.
Similarly, the authors in [46] also determined the DG optimum size based on an optimization
method by allowing for a set of constraints, formulated to keep the protection coordination in the
DN. Power losses and system voltage limitations are also being considered to avoid adverse effects to
the existing system. The result shows that protection coordination constraint dominates the line loss
constraint. If it is not being considered, a larger DG size can be achieved but it will cause failure in the
protection coordination.
In [48], the optimal status of sectionalizing and tie-switches are identified using a binary PSO.
In order to ensure the protective devices are coordinated due to the presence of DG, the authors had
developed a graph theoretic method to preserve the radial topology constraints of the DN.
. . i iti t t rre t ccor i to er i al oltage
authors in [40,49] introduced a meth d to prev nt the negative impact caused by
inv rter-based DGs towards DN protection systems. This was achieved by limiting the DG inverter
o tput current in ccordance with the DG terminal voltage. This c ntrol method is simple and effective
to avoid the fault from DGs and subsequently avoiding its impact to fuse-recloser coordinatio .
In addition, this method has proved effective against non-fault transient isturbances r c
i cti t rs st rti c rre t l s itc i . It s l e te t t t is et effecti el
tili es t e sizes in the existing DN and at the same time does not invol e any modification in the
existing DN. Therefore this method is inexpensive and easy to implement.
fi ti l i tri ti st ecte it s
i , iscussion on strategies to m tigate the impact of DG will focus on the aspect
of mod fying the conventional distribution ystem. R cently, a lot of proposals ere t
e iti ation strategies for t is ti r ,
fi l .
are based on protec ion relays technology, adaptive protecti n, m dification of fault curren
level, voltage based, symmetrical components and optimization pro ection relay setting.
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Table 4. Comparison of protection strategies for modified DN connected with DG.





1. Protection Relay Technology
a. Directional Over
Current Relay
 Able to sense current for both directions effectively
to solve the bidirectional power flow impact.
 Good selectivity and able to avoid adjacent feeders
tripping effects
 Capital cost is high with double cost of relays, CT,
and CB required.
 Difficulty to set for all contingencies scenario.
Directional Over
Current Relay No Expensive
b. Distance Relay
 Relay setting is constant for a wide variety of
changes to the protected line.
 Suitable for closed-loop and mesh due to its
directional element.
 Faster relay operation time.
 Small range of parameter for relay characteristics.
 Required a voltage transformer which contributes
to additional cost.
 Setting procedure of distance relay could be more
difficult than conventional OC relay.
Distance Relay Yes Reasonable
c. Inverse Time
Admittance Relay
 Capable to distinguish and isolate the faults in both
grid-connected and autonomous micro-grids.
 Capable to sense multiple fault levels in DN.
 Provides backup protection to its immediate
downstream relay.
 Able to isolate the faulty section on the upstream
feeder and downstream region without affecting
DG based on admittance measurement.
 Does not require safety margin to cover the
protection zones.
 Risk of miscalculations in the measured admittance
due to fault resistance.
 The effectiveness of the scheme has not
been validated.
Inverse Time
Admittance Relay No Expensive
d. Differential Relay
 Capable to protect DN either in radial or
looped feeders.
 Not sensitive to bidirectional current flow effects.
 Difficult and expensive to be applied due to too
many distribution lines and the needs of a
communication link between relays.
 Has not been experimentally validated.
 Effective only for line protection and had not the
ability to protect buses connected to DGs or loads.
Digital relay Yes Very expensive
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Table 4. Cont.






 Dynamic change features in settings between relays.
 Communication improves the speed of operation.
 Application of universal protocol language had
standardized the communication and expedites
the development.
 Off-line analysis data may consume large amounts
of computational memory storage and
become expensive.
 Higher cost due to the requirement of advance
digital relays and DN
communication infrastructure.
 Failure on communication system will result









 FCLs are significantly lower cost than
sub-station upgrade.
 FCLs are more suitable for DN with multiple DGs.
 FCLs increase recovery time which
reduced disruption.
 FCLs improve system reliability when renewable
sources are added.
 The response of energy storage is fast.
 Energy storage helps in rapid grid voltage recovery.
 Impedance values of FCL are hard to determine due
to the mutual influence of rotating-based DG.
 High investment cost to provide storage devices
which capable to withstand high fault current levels
from DN.









 Can be used for both in-zone and out of zone
fault protection.
 Rapid in identifying the fault.
 Voltage drop within DN affects its performance.
 Difficult to detect HIF and symmetrical faults.
 No generic methodology available. Methods
specific to design or characteristic of DN
are available.
 Impractical for complex DN.
 Needs communication links which will increase
the cost.
Voltage
monitoring relay Yes Expensive
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Table 4. Cont.







 More suitable for protection against reverse power
and DG with high penetration.
 Does not require synchronous fault measurement
data beforehand.
 Short duration trip time.
 Need communication links.
 Failure of communication devices affects the
coordination of the protection method.





 The developed algorithms are able to solve
dedicated optimization problem depends on its
potentials and features.
 A combined technique with protection devices will
result in a fast and reliable distribution
protection system.
 The complexity of protection algorithm.
 The optimal solution depending on the large
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4.1. Protection Relays Technology
The following subsections describe a few protection strategies using relays as main protection
components. These consist of directional overcurrent relays, distance relays, inverse time admittance
relays, and differential relays.
4.1.1. Directional Overcurrent Relays
The connection of DG in DN emulates the concept of transmission networks (TN) as a non-radial
circuit. The protection philosophy of TN applies directional and distance protection fundamentals to
identify the faults, even in the case of various fault current sources [50]. Prior of radial feeders been
connected to the DG, directional features must be well-thought out due to the fact that traditional
overcurrent relays are incapable of sensing bidirectional current flows. Hence, in order to mitigate
the risk of protection line failure in DNs, the original protection components are recommended to be
enhanced with directional overcurrent relays (DOCRs) [34,51].
Antonova et al. [34] explained the unwanted false tripping impact and its mitigation strategies
by using directional elements which will only permit the feeder relay to trip due to forward fault,
i.e., from load to source. Figures 4 and 5 explain the difference between a robust and weak protection
system by using overcurrent relays with and without directional elements. In Figure 4, the fault current
(F1) will also cause CB3 to trip due to a false tripping effect when its Non-Directional Overcurrent
Relay (NDOCR) senses the fault from adjacent feeder No. 2. This scenario usually happens for DGs
connected with synchronous-based DGs. However, Figure 5 shows good coordination selectivity by
using a DOCR instead of a NDOCR. The DOCR for CB3 only senses a forward fault and thus did not
trip due to the impact of the fault happening at the adjacent feeder No. 2.
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distribution lines connected with DGs with setting on forward operation only to block the fault from
adjacent feeders [50].
4.1.2. Distance Relays
Despite the advantages of DOCR, it has some difficulties to be applied and has a constraint to set
the relay for all DN scenarios. This led to a more complex DN in which changes in generation and
system configuration resulted in multiple fault current levels in the system. In contrast, the distance relay
setting is constant to various external modifications in DN lines [56]. Typically, in a TN protection system,
the priority is to use distance relays. However, recent research has also suggested the use of distance
relays for distribution protection. Naturally, distance relays pose a directional element, thus being suitable
for closed-loop and mesh systems. The drawback of distance relays is the requirement for a voltage
transformer which contributes to a substantial additional cost compared to typical NDOCRs.
Figure 6 shows the main components of an adaptive digital distance relay. A disturbance or a
fault in the distribution line is first detected within the protection zone before being analyzed further.
In adaptive distance protection, the outputs from the fault detection unit, fault classification unit and
fault measurement unit will be analyzed by the adaptive setting unit. Compared to conventional
distance relays which only refer to a default setting to determine the trip signal, the adaptive distance
relay refers to both the default setting and adaptive setting [57].
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could be more difficult procedure than for conventional relays, in which distance relays are designed 
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connected and autonomous micro-grids [65]. By decreasing the output voltage of the converter, the 
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fault characteristics, the sequence currents and voltages at the relay positions can be measured. 
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D CR as the primary protection. However, they require an installation of distance relay to overcome
the issues of intermittent power supply from DG and loss of supply from DGs due to DG internal
operations [62]. From the aspect of stability, another advantage of distance relays is a shorter operation
time compared to conventional NDOCRs. However, deciding the distance relay settings could be more
difficult procedure than for conventional relays, in which distance relays are designed to avoid fault
under-reach or over-reach during phase-to-earth faults.
4.1.3. Inverse Time Admittance Relays (ITAs)
In general, there are three types of distance relay which are prominent for their usage and
operating characteristics, i.e., impedance, reactance, and admittance. The most common being used
is the admittance relay [56]. Dewadasa et al. [63,64] had proposed a mitigation strategy based on
an admittance relay, but enhanced it with inverse time tripping characteristic, and named it inverse
time admittance relay (ITA). ITA relays are capable of distinguishing and isolating the faults in both
grid-connected and autonomous micro-grids [65]. By decreasing the output voltage of the converter,
the ITA relay restricts the fault current according to the affected phases. Subsequently, by analyzing
Energies 2017, 10, 1864 14 of 30
the fault characteristics, the sequence currents and voltages at the relay positions can be measured.
Simulations were done to various faults types at different positions according to changes in types of
load and fault resistance. In order to reduce the output voltage, the admittance relays proposed in [66]
protect the feeder segments of a radial microgrid connected to the utility network via back-to-back
converters against the three-phase-to-ground fault.
In [63] it was highlighted, that due to the current limiting features of converters, the relay may
fail to sense a small fault current. Hence, ITA relays were introduced with further explanation on their
reach settings. In addition, an approach to compensate the fault resistance in order for the relay to
operate reliably is suggested. This relay has numerous benefits over the traditional overcurrent and
distance relays. A year later, Dewadasa [64] proposed ITA relay characteristics with fold back current
control in which the amount of line admittance will determine the relay operating time. By measuring
the admittance, this makes the relay become sensitive on the fault location. Recently in [67], authors
presented an ITA relay which able to sense multiple fault levels in DNs. This proposed ITA relay has
various improvements compared to the existing overcurrent and distance relays. It can isolate faulty
sections on the upstream at the feeder and downstream region without affecting the DG based on
admittance measurement. This relay’s inverse time characteristic does not use safety margins which
expedites the protection devices’ tripping time. Nevertheless, the impact of this proposal has not been
validated in real DNs.
4.1.4. Differential Relays
The operational concept of differential protection is illustrated in Figure 7 which is established
from Kirchhoff’s Current Law. The summation of currents in the secondary CT (i1 + i2) will determine
the relay operation. In normal conditions or due to a fault outside the protection area, the sum of
current in both CTs is opposite in phase and equal in magnitude, hence no current will be flowing in
the relay operating coil. However, when a fault occurs between the two CTs, the relay will trigger
the circuit breaker to trip due to the current which now flows in the coil. For a large protection area,
a communication system is needed to transmit the value from the CTs to the relay.
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References [68,69] propose an implementation of differential protection for DNs with DG.
In [68], the impacts of bidirectional current flow and multiple fault current level caused by the
intermittent nature of DG was taken care by the proposed mitigation strategy using a differential relay.
Simulations using various relay settings and selections of CT characteristics were proven capable of
locating the fault without modifying other relay settings. This strategy offers good discrimination
and high sensitivity towards internal faults. Looking ahead towards risk of communication failure,
this strategy was proposed with a primary and a backup protection.
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A design concept based on a central protection system was proposed in [69] which utilizes the
advantages of differential current protection. With the central system, DNO able to determine different
restraint current calculation algorithms and to adjust the multi-terminal zone protection due to the
modifications in DN topology. This proposed strategy found to be more reliable than the traditional
differential protection strategy.
The advantage of differential protection is the flexibility in the protection aspect. Due to its
operation concept of the internal zone of protection, it does not require information on the fault
currents from the DN analysis which simplifies the protection coordination. The significant advantage
of this strategy is due to its insensitivity towards bidirectional current flows. However, the differential
protection method is difficult and expensive to apply in DNs due to the large number of lines. Each line
needs to be equipped with a differential relay, together with the communication links between the
relays. The operation of this mitigation strategy has still not been experimentally validated [70]. Due to
the fact that communication system is one of the main components to differentiate the current value,
thus the risk of its failure must be highly considered with a secondary back-up protection scheme,
which make it relatively expensive.
4.2. Adaptive Protection
Adaptive protection enables relays react to any changes in the DN. To achieve this, a good
communication medium is needed to continuously update important information such as currents and
voltages in the DN. In conventional protection systems, technicians are required to be at the site to reset
the relay settings when required due to any changes in the DN. However, the presence of technicians
is not required anymore since modern DNs are equipped with automation and monitoring capabilities.
Nevertheless, due to the safety factor, DNOs prefers to assign technicians in case the situation requires
human intervention [34]. This section presents the implementation techniques in making the relay
adaptive with the help of communication infrastructure and communication protocols.
The crucial issue in deciding the relay settings is to achieve the minimum possible operating
times while maintaining coordination among all relays. Dynamic relay settings are useful in managing
the operation and protection coordination in DNs with DG. In contrast with conventional methods,
dynamic relay settings can be changed automatically in terms of current and time setting with suitable
margins. Some Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) with loop control monitoring have automatic
setting group features which are capable of adjusting the relay setting according to the fault conditions.
Dynamically, due to the numerous placements of DG, the multiple relay settings can be done according
to each group scenario including the value of pickup current and the directional settings.
Adaptive protection schemes enable different micro-grid topologies to be protected against all
fault situations. The pre-calculated relay settings for various topologies are saved in the memory
storage. Whenever the topology changes, the relays are updated with their new settings from the
database. A new generation of relays is able to create at least 6 groups setting to assist proper relay
coordination in DN which has improved the relay sensitivity and maintain its selectivity [34,71].
The authors in [72] simulated dynamic settings in adaptive protection using a traditional
relay-recloser-fuse combination with digital relays and reclosers. The new adaptive protection
coordination curve was drawn by the relay through an algorithm that senses the DG location according
to the relative current magnitudes. This strategy is effective for a limited number of DGs only. As the
number increases, the protection coordination curves become close to each other and lead to unwanted
tripping. Furthermore, the cost to establish the communications and measurement instrument is very
high. In [73], dynamic relay setting was proposed for switching of the source from grid connected to
island and vice versa by using an automatic readjustment relay settings. The relay setting changes
accordingly in terms of time and pickup current to suit the DN conditions. In order to provide more
effective protection, a communication system can be applied in order for each relay to interact and
exchange information between each other and with a central computer [65].
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An adaptive protection strategy is recommended in [36] where a micro-grid control center (MGCC)
is connected to a DOCR at each bus via a communication system. The off-line study is implemented
by creating event and lookup tables for the protection device statuses and relay settings in all MG
configurations. The MGCC observe the MGs operating state and analyzes the event and lookup
tables to coordinate the relays. In real-time operation, the computed current is matched with the
relay settings to detect the presence of a fault. The flow of fault current is analyzed with the present
interlock direction to locate the fault. This scheme adapts to several MG configurations. Protection is
provided for all fault types. The communication system speeds up the operation of the scheme.
However, this strategy is not efficient for larger MG configurations due to excessive memory used to
store large amounts of off-line data. In addition, it does not protect against HIFs and the connection of
new loads and DGs has not been considered.
Laaksonen [74] presented an adaptive protection strategy for an LV MG where a communication
system is connected to the MG Management System (MGMS) and various MG components.
Protection strategies for both the grid-connected and islanded modes are developed for components
which include the LV feeders, loads, point of common coupling (PCC), and DG units. The MGMS
senses the change in the configuration and transmits the suitable settings and pick-up limits to the
protection devices for every component. The drawbacks in this strategy are the risk of communication
network failure and the lack of a plug-and-play DGs concept feature.
In [75], Conti highlighted the practice of an Italian DNO which used telecontrol or automation
techniques. The works proposed a minimum implementations cost to the DNO by using the traditional
protection devices including telecontrol or automation systems. For a micro-grid network, with the
assumption all relays in the DN have been upgraded to digital type, researchers in [76,77] proposed
strategies to utilize a centralize computer system to review and update the relay setting values for the
objective of retaining the protection coordination between the relays, though, within the short period
of network reconfiguration and the new relay setting calculation, the protection coordination possibly
will not operate [78]. In [79,80] the authors highlighted that in practice, adaptive protection which
required an IED, and high-speed data communication system will involve high investment costs to
replace the traditional relays and to add a communication system.
In the early days of protection systems using a communication system, different protocol
languages were used by various power utilities. At the beginning, it was a huge challenge to integrate
the various protection devices from different manufacturers [81]. However, the emergence of IEC61850
as an international standard communication protocol has expedited the development of communication
systems in DNs. IEC61850 is applied to transmit the critical data such as Generic Object Oriented
Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled Values (SV) of currents and voltages. Data between relays,
DG protection devices, and IED can be shared to determine the required relay setting adjustment
according to the protection setting group [81].
A centralized adaptive protection strategy for a MG was proposed by Ustun et al. [82]. This strategy
works well with the MG component models based on IEC 61850 and IEC 61850-7-420, but it is not suitable
for complex systems with changing relay connections. Another disadvantage is that this strategy did not
consider the dynamic behavior of the communication system.
The most challenging part faced by a DNO upon the introduction of the DG is how to maintain
safe and reliable communications among each device. Although IEC 61850 GOOSE messages have
been used by the industry, however, the concern is about the higher cost due to the needs to connect
all the devices belonging to customers, especially for metering purposes. Another concern that needs
to be highlighted is the communication technologies which change very fast. For instance, GOOSE
messages to control the DG can be transmitted via WiMax (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access) technologies. However, there is a constraint on the buffer size for some WiMax devices which
are incapable of carrying defined GOOSE repetition rates. Furthermore, DNOs must be more cautious
in the administration of the configuration, management and management of the communications
infrastructure [83].
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4.3. Voltage-Based Protection
Voltage-based protection techniques such as those described in [84–86], use the voltage
measurement in the DN to identify the faults in the system. The DC quantities from the d-q
reference frame of the measured voltage are used to identify the faulty sections and protect the
DN against different types of faults [84,85]. The measured voltage in the DC quantity is compared
with predetermined threshold quantities. If it exceeds the value, the faulted zone is tripped and the
type of fault is identified. Typical implementation of a voltage-based protection scheme is shown in
Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Typical implementation of voltage based protection scheme.
A voltage-based protection scheme utilizing the voltages from the park transformation is proposed
in [87]. The proposed method has the ability to protect DN against three phase, two-phase and
single-phase to earth faults. The method does not utilize communication links. However the operation of
the protection scheme could be optimized when communication links are provided. In [88] a protection
scheme based on bus bar voltage is proposed for both grid connected and islanded DNs. Although the
voltage-based methods are capable of detecting faults in and out of the protection zones within the DN,
they are unable to detect high impedance faults (HIF) and symmetrical faults. In addition, the need for
effective communication links is essential to implement the voltage-based protection for DNs.
4.4. Symmetrical Components
These protection strategies mainly utilize symmetrical current components for analysis in order to
provide protection for the existing DN. A fault protection scheme for DNs was proposed in [89],
that uses both zero and negative sequence current components to identify the fault scenarios.
In [90], a positive sequence-based protection for DNs consisting of inverter-based DG sources is
presented. The proposed method can detect faults and does not require synchronous fault data
measurements beforehand.
Protection strategies utilizing sequence current components were used to protect DNs from the
the effects of reverse power flows. Very recently, a protection strategy based on sequence current
components was introduced by the authors in [91] to detect the reverse power flow in spot DNs with
high DG penetration. In addition, a positive sequence fault component-based pilot protection scheme
is devices in [92] for the protection of closed loop DNs with DG. Figure 9 shows s typical configuration
of s closed loop distribution network with two busbars M and N. The configuration consists of remote
thermal units (RTU) which are installed in each ring network cabinet (RNC). The RTUs can monitor
both the voltage and current flow between bus bars. Master station (MS) monitors all the RTUs in the
system and makes decision on steps to recover the system.
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This protection scheme also includes protection against reverse power flow that is caused due to
the large penetration of DGs in the DN. Although these sy metrical components-based protection
strategies is proved to be effective, the necessity for strong communication links have made it difficult to
implement it in real time. Moreover, in case of communication link failures, the protection coordination
may be disrupted, which may prove costly.
4.5. Protection Relay Settings Optimization
In previous Section 3.2, strategies to fi d the optimum capacity and placement of DG wer
introduced to mitigat the mp ct of DG on conventional DNs which are using existing overcurrent
relays as their main protection component. However, in this section th mitigatio strategy is still
usi g an optimization approach, ut with a focus on strategies to find the optimum protection
set ings value, with con ideration on using additional protection components such as DOCR
FCL. Optimization methods in protection coordination inv lv a system configuration on DN with
the problem being formulated as a linear or nonlinear pr gramming problem, and resolved via the
simplex method as well as its vari nts. Co pare to t e optimization of DG size and location which is
a popular topic among researchers, works on finding the op mum protection settings for DNs with
connected DG are still few in number. Among the recent methods proposed by the experts are the
mathematical lgorithms, genetic alg rit ms, modified particle swarm optimization, ANN and expert
systems. These optimization techniques are applied together with other protection devices in order
to achieve the most significant protection strategy for the dedicated system. Researchers keep on
exploring new optimization algorithms and techniques to achieve the optimum relay setting values
which results in a fast and reliable distribution protection system.
4.5.1. Mathematical Algorithm Approach
Mathematical algorithms is based on numerical calculations, which are derived from mathematical
equations. Researchers have studied the new setting algorithms which depend on optimally designed
objective functions and protection components as one system. Recently, research [93–95] on this
approach is mostly done using DOCR as the main protection devices due to their advantages as
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described in Section 4.1.1, but with a different algorithm. Each algorithm was introduced as an
optimization method to obtain the correct and quick setting of all protections in a DG network.
Ehrenberger et al. [93] focused on optimization based on DOCR with inverse-time characteristics.
They proposed a quick optimization automatic algorithm with the objective function, in line with
the topical system configuration and validated using simulation in SIMPoruchy 2.1. As the network
system configuration had become specific, this algorithm can perform a quick setting for an adaptive
protection scheme.
A more complex mathematical algorithm using a Modified Electromagnetic Field Optimization
algorithm (MEFO) was used in [94] which solved the DOCR optimal coordination problem using an
improved version of the EFO. The DOCR optimal coordination problem has been formulated as a
non-linear programing (NLP) problem and as a mixed integer NLP according to the nature of the
optimized parameters. The results demonstrate that the MEFO is an efficient and reliable tool for the
coordination of DOCR and better than those obtained using a number of well-known optimization
techniques compared in its reference.
In [95], Zeineldin and his research group proposed a coordination strategy which attained
a 50% decrease in overall relay operating time. This mitigation approach applied user defined
characteristics for the inverse time DOCR and the problem was formulated as a nonlinear optimization
in which each relay will have four optimal settings. The result also interpreted that, regardless of the
DG capacity or its placement and the number and locations of fault points, this strategy is capable of
reducing relay operating times.
Compared to the above strategy which is formulated as a NLP, more recently, the authors in [54]
had to focus on future DG planning scenarios and formulated a linear programming problem. It had a
simplex algorithm with application of FCL which can identify a set of optimum relay settings which is
effective for every potential new DG installation.
4.5.2. Meta Heuristic and Intelligent Techniques
The meta-heuristic technique is an iterative generation process to identity the most optimal
solutions via learning strategies that merges different concepts to scour the search space. This strategy
is widely applied to find the exact or near exact optimal solutions. Genetic algorithm (GA)
and particle swarm optimization (PSO) are among the techniques in this meta-heuristic category.
Meanwhile, artificial intelligence (AI) is a technique which imitates the human logical thinking system
and duplicates it to in computer programs which can be used to reconfigure networks such as has
been used in expert systems.
A genetic algorithm (GA) is used in [96] to coordinate protection settings of FCL and DOCR in a
micro-grid. The complex computational problem was formulated as a constrained NLP problem and
GA with the static penalty constraint-handling method is used to solve it. However, one issue that
must be considered is whether the proposed coordination times allow sufficient time for conventional
synchronous generators to ride through faults and continue in stable operation. In addition to the
issues, the low fault current impact contributed by converter-based DG and energy storage devices
was not tested on this strategy, thus it become potential work for further research. The protection
coordination issues which have many limitations due to coordination requirements were emphasized
by Chakor et al. [97]. They highlighted a drawback of heuristic-based optimization techniques which
may wrongly converge to points that are not optimum. This happens as a result of challenges to
obtain the initial feasible solution and the large parameter range of design variables. For improvement,
the optimization problem is formulated as a constrained NLP optimization and determined via GA.
Although DOCRs are the most preferred protection components, their function will also deteriorate
due to the connection of DNs with DG especially in protection miscoordination. Hence, the authors
in [98] suggest a strategy by engaging an adaptive protection scheme using GA. The problem to
calculate the optimum values of Plug Setting and Time Multiplier Setting for OC relays was formulated
using GA.
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In mitigating strategies through optimization of relay settings, the particle swarm optimization
(PSO) technique is also applied to improve the protection coordination. In [99], protection coordination
was set as a constraint in the optimization process, and the original PSO algorithm was modified in
order to deal with the constraint. Compared to the original PSO, the modified PSO is able to find
a better optimal solution for the protection coordination issues. Furthermore, for a bigger problem,
the modified PSO still manage to find a better solution than deterministic methods. The improvement
over the initial PSO algorithm is in the phase initialization part and phase updating part of the PSO
algorithm. In MPSO, all particle positions in the D-dimensional space are not moved simultaneously
but only one in each dimensional space at a time [100]. In [101], the technique to solve the DOCR
coordination issues in DN with DG by using MPSO with a linear programming algorithm was
introduced. The objective of the suggested method is to calculate the pickup currents and time dial
settings for every DOCR that can reduce the total relay operating times. The proposed method is good
in finding the best (fastest) pickup current and time dial settings for the directional relay setting which
can protect the distribution network faster and better.
The authors in [102] used an expert system to improve the protection coordination settings in
DNs with DG connections. The inference process utilizes the coordination and selection rules to search
the optimum coordination settings by referring to the processed data (circuit, equipment, protection,
and DG) in the knowledge base. Whenever there is a conflict in the setting, users can overrule it with
their own decision. By default, the rules are programmed according to different protection scenarios
and can be changed accordingly. This approach is used as a decision tool by DNOs to study the
influence of DG on DNs, before modification of the various coordination settings can be done.
4.6. Modification of Fault Current Level
The previous strategies are focused on the aspect of protection coordination and fault detection.
Another aspect which can mitigate the impact of DG connection to DNs is the modification of fault
current levels. DNs with DGs is usually operated at grid-connected mode, but seamless transition from
grid-connected mode to autonomous mode takes place during the event of a disturbance. There is a
change in fault current levels in the grid-connected mode and autonomous mode, and the design of
suitable protection schemes to ensure safe operation of DNs from these disturbances is a real challenge.
In order to alleviate this, there is a possibility to modify the fault current level when the transition from
grid-connected mode to autonomous mode happens and vice versa. Application of external devices
known as fault current limiters (FCL) and energy storage devices was also suggested by researchers to
alter the fault current level.
4.6.1. Fault Current Limiters
Fault current limiters (FCLs) are series elements which have zero or very small impedance
during normal operation and the impedance value increases during fault conditions in order to
prevent the overcurrent. FCLs detect the fault rapidly and withstand the fault current until corrected.
In addition the fault current is cleared with a certain level of power quality. In [103], a central protection
system for DNs with DGs, using FCL was proposed to estimate the fault current and to isolate the
fault. The protection system utilizes a TCP/IP-based Ethernet communication network to update
the currents of the relays and to detect the direction of fault currents in the system. The proposed
system can respond to dynamic changes during both grid-connected mode and autonomous mode.
A resistive-type superconducting FCL (SFCL) is used in [104] to alleviate the fault current level caused
by the impact of DG in DNs. It was found that installing SFCLs at the starting point of feeders may
result in reduction of fault current contribution. An optimal utilization of FCL to coordinate the over
current relay for a network consisting of DG sources is studied in [105]. Similarly, coordination of over
current relays in DN utilizing FCL was reported in [106]. In addition, application of FCL for protection
of DNs can be found in [107–109].
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4.6.2. Energy Storage
The value of the fault current for the inverter-based DG is significantly much less during the
islanded operation of DNs with DGs. As a result, protection relays fail to activate the overcurrent
protection devices installed in the system. Therefore installing energy storage devices such as flywheels,
batteries or capacitors in the DN, can increase the fault current level allowing the protection devices to
be operated in a conventional way [36,110]. A coordinated protection strategy using superconducting
FCL and superconducting magnetic energy storage (SMES) was devised for DNs with DGs in [111].
This protection strategy can mitigate the impact of solar PV generation for a grid-connected DN.
The coordinated use of both FCL and SMES produces the best comprehensive performance with the
reduced capacity of SMES. Similarly, a protection scheme was proposed in [112] using FCL with SMES
to mitigate the impact of grid-connected DNs consisting of wind turbine system. Some important
DN protection schemes considering energy storage devices to modify the fault current level can be
found in [113–115]. The high cost of energy storage devices is the major hindrance in the deployment
of DN’s protection scheme involving these energy storage devices.
4.7. Other Protection Strategies
Other than the strategies explained above, there are also other strategies which focus on
interconnection between DNs and DGs, which are worthy of being highlighted here:
a. Inrush current detection is used to avoid unwanted disconnection caused by a 2nd harmonic
which is produced when the transformer is energized [34,116].
b. DGs’ rotor overheating can be avoided by applying negative sequence protection [117].
c. Reverse power protection is used to sense the internal fault from DG and mitigate it either by
immediately disconnecting from the DN with a time delay, or riding through the fault [118].
d. Auto-reclosure is able to minimize the disconnection impact by auto-reconnecting the DG with
the DN depending on a number of faults, especially when due to temporary faults such as surges.
However, extra protection needs to be considered to avoid from permanent faults from damaging
the equipment [119].
e. Among the lightning impacts on DNs connected with DG are the increase of voltage and
change of power flow which affect the protection coordination and selectivity, as well as voltage
fluctuations. In [120,121], authors proposed lighting protection strategies to determine the
optimum size, location and quantification of the surge arresters to protect the DN.
5. Discussion
This section analyzes and discusses important factors that need to be considered for connecting
DG to a DN and issues from a protection perspective. The summary of benefits, drawbacks and
comparison of the conventional and modified protection is presented in Tables 1 and 4, respectively.
5.1. Conventional Distribution Protection System
In the conventional DN protection, there are four strategies that have been discussed.
The advantages and disadvantages in terms of technical and cost of each strategy are summarized in
Table 1. The most appropriate strategy will depend on the willingness of a power utility in invest in
new technology such as islanding detection and FRT. For minimum protection investment, the best
strategy is to limit the DG penetration, which must be done during the planning stage. This will keep
the operation of the DN with single power flow and meet the existing protection device characteristics.
This approach is beneficial for DNOs, but there is a challenge for the DG owner in that the DG output
capacity is underutilized. This affects the DG operational efficiency and capital investment.
From the operational point of view, it will be worth to keep with the conventional protection
systems when considering low load growth, cheap tariffs, aging DN components and expensive
protection device replacement costs. Alternatively, existing protection strategies been practiced which
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are either to disconnect the DG during faults or ride through the fault can be highly considered in
conventional protection system to ensure protection requirements are fulfilled. However, this approach
is only practical for a short term due to the growing demand of DG penetration in the future. It is a
challenging mission to change the current practice in DNO operation which already safe and secure
to a new protection scheme to cater DG penetration impact. Moreover, DNOs need to invest to have
this new protection scheme. A lot more studies are needed to convince DNOs to apply this and
disturb their current business operations. These disadvantages have attracted more development of
potential solutions either to retain or to enhance conventional protection systems as highlighted in the
Sections 3 and 4.
5.2. Modified Distribution Protection System
For modified distribution protection systems, there are six strategies that have been discussed.
Their advantages and disadvantages are summarized in Table 4. Among these strategies, choosing the
right relay technologies and optimizing the relay setting are the most viable in terms of planning and
economics. In planning, ideally, the best protection strategy is to upgrade the protection system by
installing additional protection devices and communication systems. For future planning or for a new
DN, it is highly recommended to install new DOCRs as it is the best strategy to mitigate the impact of
bidirectional power flow. However, the utility company may need to consider the high capital cost
and the difficulty to configure the setting values for all contingency scenarios. In the optimization of
protection relay settings, most of the proposals focus on finding the optimal protection coordination by
using DOCRs. These optimization strategies aim to search for the best (fastest) pickup current settings
and time dial settings which can protect the DN faster and more reliably.
A combined strategy using DOCRs with adaptive protection will further improve the protection
system and reliability. From the literature, these proposed strategies are sustainable for future growth
of DG penetration towards smart grid and micro-grid applications. However, the challenges are the
cost and time effectiveness. The decision to equip DNs with new protection devices must consider
the capital investment by the DNO and DG owner which will affect the consumer, especially in terms
of electricity tariffs. Depending on which strategy to apply, DNOs may have to replace the existing
protection devices such as overcurrent relays with new protection devices. At present, DNOs are
inclined towards minimum-cost solutions, in line with the concept that DN protection should just be
sufficient to ensure safety and minimize damage. A good planning within a time frame to enhance the
DN with suitable protection strategies will help the DNOs prepare for the future.
As presented in the literature, most of the proposed protection strategies are applicable to DNs
with dedicated topology and specific types of DG. Therefore, prior of DG connection, the DNO
requires a comprehensive protection coordination study on the DN. Thus, it is necessary for innovative
protection methods to be enhanced and formulated for application to a general DN connected with
DG. Through innovative protection strategies, service continuity to customers will be improved
and DG penetration in DNs will be increased. However, researchers still face challenges to find an
innovative method. Among the challenges are limited real-time DNs to be tested and economic
factors. European countries were the pioneers in innovative protection methods due to awareness and
government policy on green technology which has increased the demand for DG.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper has reviewed most of the protection strategies which have been applied or proposed
to mitigate the impact of DG on DNs. The basic principles, reviews of previous works, benefits
and drawbacks associated to each mitigation strategy have been analyzed. In general, the strategies
to mitigate the impact of DG on DNs can be divided into two perspectives; either to maintain the
conventional protection system or to modify it. Aiming to avoid major changes to distribution
protection systems, strategies from a perspective to maintain it will minimize the cost to the DNO
and operational downtime to the industrial consumer. On the other hand, the second perspective
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involves modification of the DN by introducing additional protection components which is costly,
but worthwhile for future DG penetration.
The criteria of a good protection strategy are reliability, selectivity, speed, cost and simplicity.
However, to have all these criteria in a single protection strategy is almost impossible due to various
factors, such as existing operational, future planning, economical cost, as well as relay characteristics.
Furthermore, each protection strategy proposed by researchers is merely for a specific test scenario and
DG technology. With the integration of DG into DNs, DG owners face a huge challenge to ensure a
good return of their investment cost. In addition, DNOs also face a challenge to ensure safe operation
of DN due to the impact of changing fault current and dual power flow.
According to the presented analysis of the various technical publications, the main conclusions
and recommendations on the subject of protection mitigation strategies can be stated as follows:
(a) Existing standard and utility codes on distribution protection are the stepping stone towards
enjoying the benefits of DG. Enhancement through research will expedite the penetration of DG.
Both should enrich the critical requirements by specifying uniform criteria and requirements
relevant to the performance, operation, and safety.
(b) Upgrading the protection devices is inevitable in future DNs in order to mitigate the impact of
DG while maximizing its benefits.
(c) Irrespective of the protection strategy, adaptive protection via high-speed communication-based
solutions will support better operation and protection coordination. This is in line towards the
application of self-healing smart grid architectures and IEC61850 in DNs. However, the risk of
failure in a communication system has to be mitigated.
(d) Due to the impact of bidirectional power flow on DNs, the need of directional over current relays
(DOCRs) is vital.
(e) Publications on optimization of protection relay settings in DG environments are still less
numerous compared to other areas in power system protection.
(f) In order to get an optimal protection system and optimal DG benefits, a combined action of
different protection strategies will result in better protection and reliability.
(g) For a particular mitigation strategy to be effective, its basic working principles must be
comprehensively understood. This will help DNOs select a strategy that best suits their needs
and infrastructure.
(h) Looking forward, various available publications have demonstrated different protection strategies
to mitigate the impact of DG on DNs, but the solutions are limited. Essentially in perspective of
network reconfiguration (NR), further research on NR would be beneficial for researchers, DNOs
and industry players.
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